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Abstract  
Wireless  Sensor  Networks  are extremely vulnerable  to any  kind  of 
routing attacks due to several factors such as wireless transmission 
and resource-constrained nodes. In this respect, securing the packets 
is  of  great  importance  when  designing  the  infrastructure  and 
protocols  of  sensor  networks.  This  paper  describes  the  hardware 
architecture  of  secure  routing  for  wireless  sensor  networks.  The 
routing  path  is  selected  using  Ad-hoc  on  demand  distance  vector 
routing protocol (AODV). The data packets are converted into digest 
using  hash  functions.  The  functionality of  the  proposed method  is 
modeled  using  Verilog  HDL  in  MODELSIM  simulator  and  the 
performance  is  compared  with  various  target  devices.  The  results 
show that the data packets are secured and defend against the routing 
attacks with minimum energy consumption.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A  Wireless  Sensor  Network  (WSN)  is  an  aggregation  of 
sensor nodes, distributed in an environment, to sense and collect 
information.  A  typical  WSN consists  of  low-cost,  low-power, 
and  energy-constrained  sensors  responsible  for  monitoring  a 
physical phenomenon and reporting to access points where the 
end-user  can  access  the  data.  Wireless  Sensor  networks  are 
widely used in tracking, security, area monitoring, industrial and 
health monitoring. 
Current  proposals  for  routing  protocols  [1]-[2]  in  sensor 
networks optimize the routing algorithms for limited capabilities 
of the nodes and the specific nature of the networks, but do not 
consider security issues. Although these protocols have not been 
designed with security as a goal, it is important to analyze their 
security  properties.  Sensor  Nodes  have  insecure  wireless 
communication,  limited  node  capabilities  and  easily  prone  to 
internal threats. The adversaries can use high energy and long 
range communication to attack the network. Most network layer 
attacks  such  as  Spoofed,  Altered,  or  Replayed  Routing 
Information,  Selective  Forwarding,  Sinkhole  Attacks,  Sybil 
Attacks,  Wormhole  Attacks,  Hello  Flood  Attacks  and 
Acknowledgement  Spoofing  degrades  the  performance  of  the 
network. By spoofing, altering, or replaying routing information, 
adversaries may be able to create routing loops, attract or repel 
network traffic, extend or shorten source routes, generate false 
error  messages,  partition  the  network,  increase  end-to-end 
latency, etc. 
Existing  papers  [3]-[6]  address  the  defending  mechanisms 
against  routing  attacks  in  algorithmic  level  by  modifying  the 
routing  protocol  and  suggests  the  detection  mechanisms. 
Researchers  have  proved  high  detection  accuracy  based  on 
packet  delivery  ratio,  Network  throughput,  communication 
overhead  and  routing  overhead.  The  major  limitations  of  the 
software approach are as follows: 
1.  Specific Detection Mechanism is required for each routing 
attack. 
2.  Communication Cost and Computational time is increased.  
3.  Additional memory for executing the detection algorithm is 
required. 
4.  Routing overhead is introduced and thus reduces the life 
time of the node while processing the control packets used 
for detection. 
The motivation of this paper is to design the route processor 
to overcome the limitations of the exiting method. The wireless 
sensor nodes have limited life time, memory, and computational 
capabilities.  The  limitations  of  sensor  nodes  have  to  be 
considered while proposing a solution in hardware. Therefore, 
the main idea is to implement the route processor which in turn 
contains  the  routing  and  encryption  process  in  hardware  to 
prevent the routing attacks and to support reliable data delivery. 
The  major  feature  of  the  proposed  method  provides  unique 
solution to routing attacks. The security threats such as Integrity 
and  Authenticity  gives  secure  communication  between  the 
source node and destination node. The comparison of existing 
and  proposed  mechanism  is  shown  in  Fig.1.  The  rest  of  this 
paper is organized as follows.  
In section 2, the hardware architecture of secure routing is 
explored. In section 3, Simulation results are presented. Finally, 
in the conclusion the scope of future work is presented.  
2. SECURE AODV ROUTING PROTOCOL  
The AODV is a reactive protocol; routes are created  only 
when  a  node  wants  to  communicate  with  another  node.  The 
primary objectives of AODV are to discover the path, to identify 
the destination and to transfer the encrypted packets between the 
source and destination. There are four types of control packets 
RREQ, REER, HELLO and RREP. The first three are sent by 
broad cast, while RREP is sent by unicast. It discovers the route 
based  on local routing  table. The algorithm  enables dynamic, 
self  starting,  and  multi-hop  routing  between  the  participating 
mobile sensor nodes. 
The  existing  algorithm  is  implemented  in  software  and 
requires  more  power  consumption.  It  consumes  longer 
processing  time  for  execution  of  algorithm.  The  existing 
algorithm is insecure and it is prone to network routing attacks.   
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Fig.1. Comparison of Detection Mechanism using Hardware and Software approaches 
Fig.2.  represents  the  basic  design  approach  for  secured 
AODV  routing  protocol.  Initially,  the  node  is  in  ideal  state. 
When an originator needs to communicate with another node, 
namely the destination, the source of the originator broadcasts 
the RREQ message. Once the destination is reached, it generates 
RREP message which is unicast to the source. It is known that a 
node can be a source, an intermediate node and a destination. 
When a node in an active route gets lost, a route error message 
(RERR) is generated to notify the other nodes on both sides of 
the link of the loss of the link. 
Route  discovery  is  initiated  by  broadcasting  a  RREQ 
message.  The  route  is  established  when  a  RREP  message  is 
received. A source node receives multiply RREP messages with 
different routes. It then updates its routing entries if and only if 
the RREP has a greater sequence number, i.e. fresh information. 
Reverse  path  setup  is  established  while  transmitting  RREQ 
messages through the network each node notes the reverse path 
to the source. When the destination is found the RREP message 
will travel along this path, so no more broadcasts will be needed. 
When a broadcast RREQ packet arrives at a node having a 
route to the destination, the reverse path will be used for sending 
a  RREP  message.  While  transmitting  this  RREP  message  the 
forward path is set up. As soon as the forward path is built the 
data  transmission  can  be  started.  Data  packets  waiting  to  be 
transmitted  are  buffered  locally  and  transmitted  in  a  FIFO-
Queue when a route is set up. After a RREP was forwarded by a 
node, it can receive another RREP. 
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Fig.2. Secure AODV Routing Protocol 
This  new  RREP  will  be  either  discarded  or  forwarded, 
depending on its destination sequence number: 
•  If  the  new  RREP  has  a  greater  destination  sequence 
number,  then  the  route  should  be  updated  and  RREP  is 
forwarded  
•  If the destination sequence numbers in old and new RREPs 
are the same, but the new RREP has a smaller hop count , 
this new RREP should be preferred and forwarded 
•  Otherwise all later arriving RREPs will be discarded. 
In the proposed method, security has been added to prevent 
the packet transmission from malicious node attack. This is done 
by  padding  the  22-bit  packet  with  additional  bits  so  that  the 
original packet being transferred to the neighbor node identifies 
the  malicious  node  as  20-bits.  This  encrypted  data  is  again 
decoded  and  combined  with  the  original  packet  being 
transferred. If both are same, then the node is considered to be in 
the sensor network, else it is noted to be a malicious node.  
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After finding it as error free, the path between the original 
node and the destination is established. The source in turn will 
send the data packets to the destination. 
There are various control packet formats. A 22-bit packet is 
taken in this case for a miniature model since the real time data 
packets are of 192-bits in length. The packet formats considered 
for the design is shown in Fig.3, which is used throughout the 
design. 
2.1  ARCHITECTURE  OF  SECURED  AODV 
ROUTING PROTOCOL 
The basic functional block diagram  of the secured AODV 
routing  protocol  for  mobile  wireless  sensor  nodes  is  given  in 
Fig.4. A wireless sensor node can be either stationary or mobile. 
The  data  is  routed  from  the  source  to  destination  through  a 
routing  protocol.    Since  node  size  is  small  and  has  limited 
power, a unique architecture is required for secure routing. The 
architecture  contains  processor,  input  buffer,  output  buffer, 
cache memory, control unit, integrity and FIFO memory. The 
purpose  of  I/O  buffer  is  to  store  the  incoming  and  outgoing 
message packets. The purpose of cache memory is used to store 
the addresses of the adjacent nodes to forward the packet. This is 
implemented in the form of matrix representation. The FIFO is 
used to store the address of the nodes, which lies in the forward 
path. The hardware contains comparator, decoder, multiplexer, 
latch, and flip-flops for route discovery and data integrity. The 
architecture  of  the  secured  AODV  routing  protocol  is  given 
below in Fig.4. 
 
RCAK  TYPE (4)  RESERVED (18) 
 
DATA  TYPE (4)  RESERVED (18) 
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Fig.3. Message packets for AODV 
 
Fig.4. Hardware Architecture of Secured AODV Routing Algorithm
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The Route Request, Route Reply, Route Acknowledge
data exchange, and probing message signals are 
the control and data path unit. The input packet contains type [4
bits]  i.e. to identify  whether  it  is  a  RREQ,  RREP,  RACK  or 
RERR. The hop count [3-bits], is incremented if the node, is an 
intermediate node. The rreq id [3-bits] contains the 
the  source  node.  The  destination  id  [3-bits]  represent
destination nodes address. The destination sequence number [3
bits] is used to check whether the node is an intermediate or not. 
The  organization  ip[3-bits]    and  organization  sequence[3
are also  present. From the message packet received
destination address alone is removed and the path to reach the 
destination  from  the  source  is  tracked.  Based  on  the  data 
received  the  message  packet  is  altered  and  the  process  is 
repeated. The Table.1 describes the bit change for the control 
signals being used for the method. Based on these control signals 
the packet functions are identified. 
Fig.5.
2.2  INTERNAL  ARCHITECTURE  OF  ROUTE 
PROCESSOR 
The route processor performs the operation of various control 
packets  present  in  AODV  [7]-[8].  The  control  packets  are 
RACK,  DATA,  RREQ  and  RERR.  The  functioning  of 
control packets is described in this section. 
2.2.1 Data exchange 
A 22 bit packet is taken in this case for a miniature model 
since the real time data packets are of 192 bits in 
incoming data packet consisting of 21 bits is stored in the 
buffer. The first 4 bits are extracted and e applied into the de
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cknowledgement, 
controlled by 
The input packet contains type [4-
bits]  i.e. to  identify  whether  it  is  a  RREQ,  RREP,  RACK  or 
bits], is incremented if the node, is an 
bits] contains the address of 
bits]  represents  the 
destination nodes address. The destination sequence number [3-
intermediate or not. 
bits]   and  organization sequence[3-bits] 
are also  present. From the message packet received only the 
destination address alone is removed and the path to reach the 
destination  from  the  source  is  tracked.  Based  on  the  data 
received  the  message  packet  is  altered  and  the  process  is 
1 describes the bit change for the control 
signals being used for the method. Based on these control signals 
Table.1. Control Packets
Control Packets 
RREQ 
RREP 
RERR 
RACK 
DATA 
The functioning of the memory unit is as shown in Fig.5
Initially  the  message  is  stored  in  the  FIFO  queue  and  it  is 
interpreted  to  identify  the  current  state  of  the  node  using 
automatic control table. The identified current state is validated 
to route the packets for next hop. The index and the address of 
the next hop are stored in the automata state table.  The routing 
table is updated in table to decide the route for the next hop.
5. Functional Representation of Memory 
2.2  INTERNAL  ARCHITECTURE  OF  ROUTE 
The route processor performs the operation of various control 
.  The  control  packets  are 
RACK,  DATA,  RREQ  and  RERR.  The  functioning  of  these 
A 22 bit packet is taken in this case for a miniature model 
in length. The 
incoming data packet consisting of 21 bits is stored in the input 
applied into the de- 
multiplexer  unit  from  which  it  is  decided  whether  it  is  route 
request, route reply, route acknowledgement, data 
route error request. Based on these control signals the rest of the 
blocks are enabled. If the incoming packet is a route request, 
then by use of comparator block, the destination address of the 
packet is compared with nodes destination address
equal then the RREP message is send to the source node. After
receiving the route acknowledgement from the source node
source nodes sequence number of the source node
with the destination nodes sequence number
then the packet is applied to the integrity module. The above 
architecture is shown in Fig.6. 
1. Control Packets 
Data-bits 
0000 
0001 
0100 
0010 
1111 
memory unit is as shown in Fig.5. 
Initially  the  message  is  stored  in  the  FIFO  queue  and  it  is 
interpreted  to  identify  the  current  state  of  the  node  using 
The identified current state is validated 
o route the packets for next hop. The index and the address of 
stored in the automata state table.  The routing 
in table to decide the route for the next hop. 
 
multiplexer  unit  from  which  it  is  decided  whether  it  is  route 
request, route reply, route acknowledgement, data exchange or 
route error request. Based on these control signals the rest of the 
If the incoming packet is a route request, 
the destination address of the 
packet is compared with nodes destination address, if both are 
equal then the RREP message is send to the source node. After 
cknowledgement from the source node, the 
of the source node is compared 
with the destination nodes sequence number. If  they are equal 
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Fig.6. Architecture of Data Exchange
The  integrity  module  being  used  is  the  MD5USHA1 
cryptographic  function.  The  module  consists  of  buffers,  XOR 
gates, registers and adder units. The input to the integrity module 
is 512 bits. The input packet from the source node consisting of 
22  bits  is  again  padded  with  the  remaining  bits  and  is  then 
forwarded to the source node along with a hit control signal. 
The  source node  on  receiving  the  control signal  generates 
hashed value based on the packet being sent to the destination 
node. Then, both the secured data from the destination node and 
the source node are compared using a 20-bit comparator. If both 
are equal, then an hash-acknowledgement signal is given to the 
destination  node along with the data packet to be transferred. 
The destination node on receiving the data packet along with the 
control signal stores the data packet in FIFO memory and sends 
the acknowledgement to the source node, as  data exchange is 
complete.         
2.2.2. Route Request (RREQ) 
If the RREQ is received, the destination address is compared 
with  the  node  address.  If  equal,  then  the  above  mentioned 
process is repeated, if not equal then destination address is sent 
to the cache memory which contains the routing information of 
the adjacent nodes. If the route to the destination node is found, 
then the packet is transferred as RREQ packet to its adjacent 
nodes. Original node address, is stored in the buffer for route 
reverse path. This is shown in Fig.7.  
2.2.3 Route Reply (RERR) 
If the packet being received is a RREQ packet, then by use of 
comparator  block  the  destination  address  of  the  packet  is 
compared with node destination address, and if both are equal 
then the RREP message is sent to the source node. After route 
acknowledgement  from  the  source  node,  the  source  nodes 
sequence  number  is  compared  with  the  destination  nodes 
sequence number and if equal the packet is then applied to the 
integrity module.  
The integrity block generates a hashed value for the above 
packet. The control signal is then sent to the source node. The 
source node generates the hashed value if both values are equal 
and the packet is forwarded. If not equal then the source nodes 
decides  it  as a  malicious  node  and  a  err-acknowledgement  is 
transferred to the malicious node. The source node also removes 
the  neighbor  node  address  from  the  route  path.  Thus  the 
malicious  node  is  being  identified.  This  is  shown  in  Fig.8.
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Fig.7. Architecture of RREQ 
 
Fig.8. Architecture of RERR 
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2.2.4 Message Encryption 
A single block of message of size 512 bits is passed through 
secure  hash  algorithm  first  and  then  through  message  digest 
algorithm  [9].  Both  the  algorithms  (extended  message  digest 
algorithm and secure hash algorithm) have four rounds and each 
round has twenty steps.  
The description of single step of both the algorithms 
in  Fig.9.  A  single  step  of  the  combined  architecture  involves 
processing through secure hash algorithm first and then through 
extended message digest algorithm. 
Fig.9. Combined Architecture of MD5 U SHA1
The first process is passing the message through the single 
step  of  the  SHA1  algorithm  and  the  resultant  values  in  the 
chaining  variables  are  shuffled  as  per  the  algorithm.  The 
chaining  variables  are  passed  through  the  extended  MD5 
algorithm where the extra 32 bit word ‘e’ is retained in the same 
variable as such.  
Then, the second step is continued. The single steps of both 
the digest algorithms are same as that of the original algorithms 
except  for  the  extended  message  digest  algorithm.  The 
concatenated  chaining  variables  in  the  end  give  the  hash 
calculated for the first block of message. This digest is then used 
as the initial value for the next block of message. In the end the 
digest for the complete message is obtained. It is observed that 
the  collision  resistant  is  improved  when  compared  with  the 
existing method. 
2.2.5 Control Unit 
The state modeling of secured AODV protocol can be seen 
below which reveals the basic process undergone by the AODV 
router  (ie)  processing  type  of  messages,  route  request,  route 
reply etc. The initial state was taken to be the idle state where 
the nodes are in reset condition without any transactions but is 
logged to the network. 
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Combined Architecture of MD5 U SHA1 
The first process is passing the message through the single 
step  of  the  SHA1  algorithm  and  the  resultant  values  in  the 
chaining  variables  are  shuffled  as  per  the  algorithm.  The 
extended  MD5 
algorithm where the extra 32 bit word ‘e’ is retained in the same 
the second step is continued. The single steps of both 
the digest algorithms are same as that of the original algorithms 
digest  algorithm.  The 
concatenated  chaining  variables  in  the  end  give  the  hash 
calculated for the first block of message. This digest is then used 
as the initial value for the next block of message. In the end the 
It is observed that 
the  collision  resistant  is  improved  when  compared  with  the 
The state modeling of secured AODV protocol can be seen 
below which reveals the basic process undergone by the AODV 
router  (ie)  processing  type  of  messages,  route  request,  route 
reply etc. The initial state was taken to be the idle state where 
in reset condition without any transactions but is 
Fig.10. Finite State model of AODV 
A node can be a source, destination or an intermediate node,
and this condition is considered in the beginning. This protocol 
is implemented using 8 states through which the control signals 
are transferred to the block and thus both the data path unit and 
the control unit functions. The Finite 
in the Fig.10. 
2.3. FUNCTIONALITY CHECK   
In the above architecture, the following changes occur in the 
output  for  the  given  input  conditions.  This  is  shown  in  the 
Table.2. 
Table.2. Functionality Check
Input 
RREQ (0000)  RREP (0001) or RREQ 
(0000) or RERR (0100)
RREP (0001)  RACK (0010) or 
RERR (0100)
RACK (0010)  DATA (0010) or 
RERR (0100)
DATA (1111)  RACK (0010) or 
RERR (0100)
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the following changes occur in the 
conditions.  This  is  shown  in  the 
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3. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
The above architecture is implemented using VHDL program 
and simulated. Fig.11. shows the RTL Schematic of the control 
signals being generated for the entire architecture. The 
generates  the  control  signals  for  finding  the  data  path.
RREQ, RREP, RACK and RERR must be HIGH. 
The  input applied is  RREQ  since  the received  node  is  an 
intermediate  node  and  the  output  being  obtained  is  RREQ, 
which is flooded to the next node and is shown in Fig
RREP is shown in Fig.13. The input applied is RACK since
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ented using VHDL program 
RTL Schematic of the control 
The processor 
the  control  signals  for  finding  the  data  path.  The 
ince the  received  node  is  an 
the  output  being  obtained  is  RREQ, 
which is flooded to the next node and is shown in Fig.12. The 
RACK since the 
packet being received is not the required destination node the 
output packet being obtained is RERR and is shown in Fig
Fig.15. shows the snapshot of Architecture after routing. The 
proposed architecture is taken up to the ASIC flow level design 
in which the floor planning and routing of the design
The area required for the proposed method for implementation in 
chip level is obtained as Area (um
2) = 18319.The power required 
for the computation is obtained using X Power Analyzer in ISE. 
The power dissipated for the target device (virtex4
The power needed for the proposed method is Total Dynamic 
Power(mw) = 420.5457 & Cell Leakage Power(µw) = 53.3523.
Fig.11. Control Signals 
Fig.12. Route Request Message 
packet being received is not the required destination node the 
being obtained is RERR and is shown in Fig.14. 
shows the snapshot of Architecture after routing. The 
proposed architecture is taken up to the ASIC flow level design 
in which the floor planning and routing of the design is obtained. 
The area required for the proposed method for implementation in 
) = 18319.The power required 
for the computation is obtained using X Power Analyzer in ISE. 
The power dissipated for the target device (virtex4), is = 216mw. 
The power needed for the proposed method is Total Dynamic 
Cell Leakage Power(µw) = 53.3523.
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Fig.13. Route Reply Message 
Fig.14. Route Error Message 
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Fig.15. Snapshot of Architecture after routing
Table.3. Comparison between the Existing and Proposed
Scheme 
Parameters  AODV  [12]  Secure AODV
Maximum  
Frequency   75.069MHz.  80MHz 
Selected Device   4Vlx25sf363-
12  4vlx25sf363
Number of Slices   55%  48% 
Number of Flip 
Flops  17%  10% 
Number of 4 input 
LUTs:  50%  44% 
Number of 
GCLKs:  6%  4% 
Connection 
Establishment 
time 
Minimum  Minimum
Topology  Dynamic  Dynamic 
Speed and 
Efficiency  Improved   Improved 
Security   Provided   Not Provided
Routing attacks  Prone to 
attacks 
Against the selective 
forward , sink hole 
and warm hole 
attacks 
Time delay   Increased  Decreased
Dynamic 
Power(mw)  Not Analyzed   420.5457 
Cell Leakage 
Power (µW)   Not Analyzed  53.3523 
Data Integrity   Not included   Hash Functions 
The proposed method is compared with the existing method 
and is shown in Table.3. It is observed that the proposed method 
is an efficient method for routing the packets in mobile wireless 
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5. Snapshot of Architecture after routing 
the Existing and Proposed 
Secure AODV 
4vlx25sf363-12 
Minimum 
 
 
Provided 
Against the selective 
forward , sink hole 
and warm hole 
Decreased 
 
Hash Functions  
The proposed method is compared with the existing method 
t is observed that the proposed method 
is an efficient method for routing the packets in mobile wireless 
sensor networks. Since routing is done in hardware
not be any possibility for intruder to know about the hop counts 
and routing information. The integrity is achieved through hash 
functions.  The  Mica  mote  is  a  small  (several  cubic  inch) 
sensor/actuator  unit  with  a  CPU,  power  sou
several optional sensing elements. The processor is a 4 MHz 8
bit  Atmel  ATMEGA103  CPU  with  128  KB  of  instruction 
memory, 4 KB of RAM for data, and 512 KB of flash memory. 
The CPU consumes 5.5 mA (at 3 V) when active, and two orders 
of magnitude less power when sleeping.
consumed  for  the  simulation,  the  algorithm  is  suitable  for 
implementation in the MICA motes. 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
The  proposed  hardware  architecture  of  secured  AODV 
routing  protocol  in  Wireless  sensor  node  provides  a  novel 
implementation  technique  that  is  invented
device from Xilinx family. This architecture reacts quickly to 
dynamic topology changes even under h
and efficiency of the node is increased. 
against network routing attacks. In this method message integrity 
is  achieved  using  the  combined  architecture  of  MD5USHA5. 
From the analysis, the message digests 
check for alteration in the message packets that are transferred. 
The delay and power of the proposed method is compared
that of existing AODV done in hardware level, where security is 
not  considered.  Also,  the  algorithm  is  found  suitable  for 
implementation in the MICA motes.
routing  protocol  cannot  be  changed  as  per  the  topology 
condition.  In future, the proposed method 
reduce time delay and it can be implemented in FPGA, that can 
be used as add on card for real time applications where wireless 
sensor nodes are used. 
 
done in hardware, there may 
not be any possibility for intruder to know about the hop counts 
information. The integrity is achieved through hash 
The  Mica  mote  is  a  small  (several  cubic  inch) 
sensor/actuator  unit  with  a  CPU,  power  source,  radio,  and 
several optional sensing elements. The processor is a 4 MHz 8-
bit  Atmel  ATMEGA103  CPU  with  128  KB  of  instruction 
memory, 4 KB of RAM for data, and 512 KB of flash memory. 
The CPU consumes 5.5 mA (at 3 V) when active, and two orders 
tude less power when sleeping. Comparing the power 
consumed  for  the  simulation,  the  algorithm  is  suitable  for 
 
proposed  hardware  architecture  of  secured  AODV 
routing  protocol  in  Wireless  sensor  node  provides  a  novel 
is  invented  using  Virtex  IV 
device from Xilinx family.  This architecture reacts quickly to 
under high traffic. The speed 
increased. The proposed method is 
this method message integrity 
is  achieved  using  the  combined  architecture  of  MD5USHA5. 
analysis, the message digests provide a secure way to 
check for alteration in the message packets that are transferred. 
f the proposed method is compared with 
that of existing AODV done in hardware level, where security is 
not  considered.  Also,  the  algorithm  is  found  suitable  for 
implementation in the MICA motes. In this proposed method, 
routing  protocol  cannot  be  changed  as  per  the  topology 
future, the proposed method is optimized further to 
be implemented in FPGA, that can 
be used as add on card for real time applications where wireless ISSN: 2229– 6948 (ONLINE)                                              ICTACT JOURNAL ON COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY, DECEMBER 2010, VOL.1, ISSUE: 04 
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